How the General Assembly Can Get Its Peace and Security Groove Back

When the Security Council is paralyzed, the General Assembly can still step up — and one veteran diplomat has a plan to make that happen.

UN Photo/Manuel Elias

The Security Council has not exactly risen to the occasion in recent years. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the war in Gaza have glaringly exposed a key flaw built into our multilateral architecture: when a veto-wielding member of the Council has a direct stake in a conflict, there is little the body can do.

To be sure, the Council remains functional. It routinely re-authorizes mandates for UN peacekeeping missions and came together to authorize a peace enforcement mission in Haiti. Yet in two of the most recent blatant examples of violations of international humanitarian law—Israel’s conduct in Gaza and Russia’s invasion of its neighbor—the Security Council was paralyzed.

But the Security Council is not the only game in town. Historically, the General Assembly—made up of all UN member states and in which no state wields a veto—has stepped in during key peace and security crises. You sometimes have to go back decades, to the General Assembly approving UN intervention in the Suez Crisis in 1956 and even the Korean War before that, but these examples demonstrate that it has not always been the case that the Assembly stands idle in the face of a divided Security Council.

My interview guest today, Axel Marschik, is a veteran Austrian diplomat who has thought extensively about how the General Assembly can play a more robust role in peace and security when the Security Council fails to do so. In a paper that was widely discussed around the UN, Ambassador Marschik proposed that the General Assembly craft pre-authorized sanctions that would be automatically triggered if the Security Council is “unable or unwilling to act to confront some of the most serious violations of international law, including aggression and mass atrocity crimes.”

Under his proposal, the General Assembly would design a suite of sanctions in the abstract that would become very real—and automatically imposed on the offending party—through a General Assembly vote should the Security Council fail to take meaningful action.

In our conversation, Ambassador Marschik fleshes out this idea, including what sorts of sanctions he has in mind and how to translate this concept into a General Assembly resolution creating such a mechanism. Ambassador Marschik currently serves as Austria’s Ambassador to Germany and previously served as Austria’s Permanent Representative to the UN from 2020 to 2025.

The episode is freely available on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. You can also listen directly below.

This episode of Global Dispatches is produced in partnership with Lex International Fund, a philanthropic initiative dedicated to strengthening international law to solve global challenges. It’s part of our ongoing series highlighting the real-world impact of treaties on state behavior, called “When Treaties Work.”

Want to partner with Global Dispatches on a series? Reach out!

Transcript edited for clarity

Amb. Marschik Axel, thank you so much for speaking with me today. I wanted to spend most of our conversation today discussing the ways in which the General Assembly can assert itself more robustly on peace and security issues. But the premise of our conversation is that the Security Council, in many key ways, has abdicated that responsibility. I’m curious to learn from you, first, do you agree with that premise? And what are the causes of that premise?

Axel Marschik:

I would say that I agree with this premise to some extent. But at the same time, I think we also have to be a bit fair to the Security Council. So, I’m probably not so comfortable with abdicated and because that would imply some sort of intention on the part of the council to give up this power. I don’t think the Council has that intention. I think it is just merely fulfilling the role that the original drafters of the charter foresaw, and that was to create an organization that can do wonderful things if member states wanted to, and can also, in the small area of international peace and security, can do things against the will of some states, but only if five states agree. That is the system that was set up.

And it is obvious that right from the beginning, we knew the system would never work against the interests of those five states who have the veto. So, in a way, the security Council will work under two premises in the area of security and peace. And that’s when the P5 want to use the United Nations as a platform, as a forum to solve an issue and if they agree how to go about this. And in times of international tension, as we are experiencing right now, but as we’ve also experienced during the Cold War in the ‘50s, we’ve of course then see that the council doesn’t work. At the same time, over the past five years or so, the council adopted over 300 resolutions. I mean, that’s as many as in the first 25 years of its existence. So, therefore, I think it hasn’t completely abdicated. However, in the most important cases and the most difficult cases, it’s absent. So, there, I agree.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

I do agree with your articulation there. I mean, if you look at the regular order of business of the Security Council, renewing mandates of peacekeeping missions or, most recently, supporting the authorization of a mission in Haiti, do you see the Security Council can coalesce there? But as you said, in some key issues in recent years, including Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza, you saw the routine use of the veto in two of the most egregious examples of violations of international law. And it’s there, I think, that a lot of public attention has focused on the limitations of the Security Council.

Axel Marschik:

I completely agree, and I can tell you I think it’s the cause of a lot of frustration among diplomats also, and U.N. experts, and everyone around the UN and international lawyers also, who are frustrated with this lack of the council being able to act in the most difficult situations, and also in the most pressing matters.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

So in the context of Russia’s routine vetoes of resolutions pertaining to its war in Ukraine, while you were ambassador at the UN, a number of other ambassadors as well put forward a initiative to try to influence the use of the veto by the Security Council and trigger a General Assembly session when a veto is cast. Can you just explain to me the logic behind that initiative, which is now in force today?

Axel Marschik:

That was the Liechtenstein initiative, I believe, and it’s been very, very interesting to see that such initiatives, even if they come from small member states, who, of course, have a lot of weight in the context of the United Nations, which does give small states also the possibility to do things, that this initiative has actually been quite impressive by nudging very large powers, the P5, to accommodate the wish of the General Assembly. Which is that if they do cast a veto in the Council, then they must come to the General Assembly and explain this and the General Assembly can use, well, I would say the gravitas of the room of the 193 member states to put pressure on the veto-wielding states and to also explain its displeasure at certain vetoes. At the moment, we have a sense that this isn’t really preventing vetoes from being cast. When we adopted this resolution, and Austria was very supportive of it from the start, we had hoped that this additional spotlight on a veto-wielding P5 member would have a sort of restraining effect on the P5.

That has not been the case. Quite clearly, as you said, the Russian aggression against Ukraine and situation in Gaza, it has not had any effect. We’ve had vetoes happening in the past years since this resolution. However, I think what it does do is it sets the stage for a General Assembly discussion. And so far, we have the member states, the wider membership, the non-Security Council membership has left it at that. We have simply had a discussion and sometimes voiced displeasure with the fact that a veto was cast. But that doesn’t have to be it. We can also use such a session — that has to happen a couple of days after the veto was cast — to adopt additional possible measures. And there, I think, it’s important to remind ourselves that the General Assembly has, in the past, been quite active in various aspects when it comes to taking the lead on peace and security measures when the Security Council does not act.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

And so that leads me to a fascinating proposal that you’ve put forward that would essentially set the stage or empower the General Assembly to impose certain means of compellence or sanctions when a veto is cast in the context of a crime of aggression or a mass atrocity event. Can you flesh out that proposal that you’ve made?

Axel Marschik:

To explain that, what we’ve had so far is that the General Assembly acts after the fact. So, if there is a veto cast in a specific situation on a resolution, then usually the General Assembly gets together and then the General Assembly acts. And sometimes, as it has in the past, been quite courageous and ambitious in adopting sanctions, arms embargoes, demands for ceasefires, troop withdrawals, even sending off peacekeeping missions. So, it’s been quite effective in the way that the General Assembly has found itself a role there in this context. The problem that we mostly have is that it is always a specific case, and usually then the targets are specific countries. Some of these countries that are then theoretically the target are very powerful countries or have very powerful friends.

And as a result, you often see that the wider membership, which is mainly comprised of smaller or medium sized states and who lack the military power, are very reluctant sometimes to actually really adopt sanctions. So, what happens is, though, there is a lot of unhappiness and maybe some voices of discontent being uttered, there are no real effective sanctions. My idea is a little bit why can’t we have a system by which we agree in advance, in an abstract way that should certain massive violations of international law occur and should the General Assembly come to the decision that these have occurred, these violations of the charter, then there are automatic measures that are implemented? What you would need, basically, is just the decision of the General Assembly, of the General Assembly saying this act done by that state violates international law.

And as a consequence, the measures that we’ve already previously adopted will come into play. What this does is it takes away the punishment against a certain state. It reduces the concern that individual small states may have to anger, a potential ally, even by simply referring to look, this is an abstract consequence that you triggered by violating international law. So, it is the violating state that automatically triggers the consequence. It is like a speed gun, a radar gun. If you go too fast, you automatically get a ticket. That is quite effective. That stops people from speeding because they know, no matter how important they are, no matter how much weight they bring to the table or weapons, they will still get that ticket. This is more or less what the idea is. Can we set up a system by which you get an automatic consequence if you violate the charter?

Mark Leon Goldberg:

And what would those consequences be potentially? What would that ticket look like?

Axel Marschik:

There, again, I think we have two things that we have to consider. First of all, states, especially smaller states, are very reluctant to impose sanctions, nasty sanctions, especially against their allies, for example. However, there are possibilities of certain consequences that we can think of that don’t necessarily have to be implemented by the states. For an example, what you could think about is even now in the charter, for example, there are such automatic consequences that states don’t individually have to actually apply. If you don’t pay your dues, after a while, you automatically lose the right to vote in the General Assembly. That’s article 19.

So there, the system itself foresees such an automatic consequence where member states don’t have to do anything. Only it just means that when you don’t pay, you eventually lose your right to participate in the voting. So, similarly, what we could think about and, again, here, I think that depends on how courageous we actually want to end up being is you can think of consequences such as having your candidates that you’ve put forward not eligible to be elected, not being able to participate in subcommittees of the UN, possibly not being able to participate in international beneficial systems such as the Postal Union. Not being able to participate in the IATA Flight Regulations, which automatically grounds all your flights and makes your airports inaccessible.

All of this is outside of any one specific state that no individual state will have to implement that. But the international civil servants will implement those measures, and they can be quite dramatic. I don’t know, cutting you off from the internet, for example. That’s a dramatic consequence that you would suffer in that case. And it does not necessarily need individual states to then adopt acrimonious sanctions against strong, powerful states.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

May I ask, though, the consequences that you just described are ones that, at least as you say them, cutting off the internet or grounding all flights are ones that, at least seem to me, might disproportionately impact regular people of the offending countries as opposed to, say, the leaders that were responsible for these decisions. So, you’re not talking about like individual targeted sanctions against people, like asset freezes or travel bans here, which is interesting to me.

Axel Marschik:

Well, I wanted to give you some examples on the very drastic end. I mean, if we have an act of aggression or an attempt to take over another country, I think you have to also have some weightier sanctions in your bag. One of the first consequences could be, and then again, you could agree, for example, in this resolution that adopts this abstract system of automaticity, you could have also a series that starts out, for example, by having the head of state speak at last at the general debate. I think, okay, that’s something that only-

Mark Leon Goldberg:

That’s like the lowest ambition idea that they have to speak last at the general debate. But the highest ambition would be something like, you know, grounding all flights or an internet cut off.

Axel Marschik:

In the resolution that adopts the abstract measures, you could have a whole series of different measures and reactions from the very weak ones that maybe target individual heads of state or government and more in a protocol way, then the state in its ability to participate in international conferences or international bodies, then potentially exclude them from financial benefits they get through various international programs and funds. And then, you know, growing in hardship, all the way to the very, very far end where not only the government is targeted but has effects for the whole country, also, simply to raise awareness of how dramatic that maybe.

But again, these are just examples of things that you could do without putting the burden on individual states to enforce these sanctions because that’s where the system currently has an issue. We are not bad in sort of the words and in the resolutions, but we’re always rather bad at implementing those.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

What are the political barriers you see to the General Assembly, actually, you know, adopting such a measure and how might those barriers be overcome?

Axel Marschik:

Well, I think the barriers mainly would arise from the fact that you have strong groups within the general Assembly. Usually, each of these groups has one or the other permanent members associated either as part of a group or as a close ally of the group. And I think for the P5, such a mechanism would, of course, undermine or at least weaken their ability to freely use vetoes. And therefore, I think it could be that they exercise a lot of pressure on their friends not to support such an initiative. On the other hand, I think it is obvious also to the P5 that the current system is creating so much frustration among the membership that if they want to maintain this system of the United Nations in the current state, which of course gives them a lot of advantage, they also have to think about reforming the system in such a way that the wider membership feels more comfortable than that.

Because at the moment, I think anyone who’s spending time at the UN at the moment, there is this deep, deep frustration with the system that is seen as not delivering on our hopes and expectations, and therefore reforms clearly have to come.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

So, I suppose, just as a purely practical matter, how might your idea, as you have articulated here, as you’ve also articulated in some papers, go from just an idea on a paper and an idea as articulated in a podcast episode, to an actual resolution of the General Assembly?

Axel Marschik:

Well, similarly, like the veto initiative, I think you would need a crisis, presumably to trigger interest among the member states and pressure that something needs to be done, and then have a small group of countries form around and rally around an idea, and then try to make sure that that is an effort that goes and is supported by all members from all regional groups, and members from the North, the South, so that you have a good cross-cutting part of the UN that puts this forward as a resolution, initiative. And then hope with, I don’t know, convincing arguments to persuade the majority of membership to put a system of this sort.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

So does that group, that coalition exist today?

Axel Marschik:

No, that those are usually ad hoc coalitions. There are some groups, like for example, there’s this ACT group that is a group of, I think more than, the Act Code of Conduct, more than 130 countries who try to improve the work of the UN organs. And that could be a group. But again, I think it would depend very much on a specific situation and on the pressures to react to a specific, particularly difficult moment with a system that tries to prevent similar situations in the future. And as such, you would need a trigger, and you would then need a quick, strong core group to put something forward to amend the system.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

You know, it’s interesting because I would think at least that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza and the mass atrocities in Gaza might be those kind of focal points that would trigger such a movement, as presumably it kind of triggered your thoughts on how to put forward this idea in the first place.

Axel Marschik:

I mean, I was there during these moments in New York, and we did put together an exploratory group to see, whether there was an interest in something like this. And at that point in time, I did not get the feeling that there was enough support. People were at that time very much focused on the reform process leading up to the Summit of the Future that we were focusing on that. Also the IGN, the Intergovernmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform were actually making some sort of progress. And there was progress for the first time since a long time in these negotiations to improve the work of the Council. And also in the Pact for the Future, we ended up in language which is actually quite courageous if it is implemented.

So, I think there was hope that the Liechtenstein Initiative, together with what seemed to be coming out of the Pact for the Future might nudge the Security Council into better processes. So, I’m not sure that we got there because now we’re in the middle of a UN80 debate. And of course, that has again shifted the whole momentum away from putting pressure on the Council to reform towards trying to get the UN to work with a lot of less. And that, unfortunately, now has taken off some of the pressure on the Council.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

So, I suppose, if nothing else, this conversation might sensitize the diplomatic community that congregates around this show to your idea, to this proposal around automaticity of sanctions should the Security Council cast vetoes or fail to intervene robustly in a crime of aggression or a mass atrocity event? Is there anything else you wanted to mention or discuss before I let you go on this topic?

Axel Marschik:

That in my view, all of these initiatives and even talking about such initiatives have one basic goal also, and that is to put friendly pressure on the Security Council and in particular, of course, the P5, in order to move forward in the reform process in the context of the IGN and the UN Security Council reform. Because I think we all are aware how we do need and we want the buy-in of the major powers because if they walk away from the UN, I think it’s in nobody’s real interest. So, we do want to keep them there, and we want to keep them in the procedures and processes that exist, but we want them to help us make them better because I think everyone understands that the current situation, the current system is unsatisfactory and is simply not delivering. And therefore, they have to come up. We already had one Security Council reform in 1963 when we expanded the council from 11 to 15.

We definitely now need another effort to really make the Council better and to make it more representative and more effective. But that needs the buy-in and the support basically also from the P5. And therefore, we need to work on this together. And all these initiatives, such as also mine with automaticity is an attempt to see, look, if you don’t do anything in making the council better from within, we’re going to come up with systems around it to make the UN system as a whole stronger.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

Well, ambassador, thank you so much for your time. This was really interesting.

Axel Marschik:

Thank you very much, Mark.

Mark Leon Goldberg:

Thanks for listening to Global Dispatches. The show is produced by me, Mark Leon Goldberg. It is edited and mixed by Levi Sharpe. If you are listening on Apple Podcasts, make sure to follow the show and enable automatic downloads to get new episodes as soon as they’re released. On Spotify, tap the bell icon to get a notification when we publish new episodes. And, of course, please visit globaldispatches.org to get on our free mailing list, get in touch with me, and access our full archive. Thank you!