The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the most important and impactful global agreement on nuclear weapons. Since it entered into force in 1970, 191 countries have joined the NPT, with just a few notable exceptions, including India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Sudan. The NPT has three essential pillars: countries that do not have nuclear weapons cannot acquire them; countries that do have nuclear weapons must work toward disarmament; and countries should have access to civilian nuclear technologies under proper safeguards.
Every five years, the parties to the NPT come together for what is known as a Review Conference, in which they assess progress toward these three pillars and discuss ways to strengthen the treaty. The NPT RevCon, as it is known, is one of the major multilateral conferences on nuclear security, and it is taking place at the UN from April 27 to May 22.
Joining me to discuss the significance of this NPT Review Conference is Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association. We kick off with a discussion of the NPT itself and its impact over the decades, and then have a long conversation about the key storylines, diplomatic intrigues, and policy debates that will unfold over the next three weeks at the UN. Consider this episode your curtain-raiser for the most important global gathering on nuclear security of the past five years.
This episode is freely available on Spotify, Apple Podcasts and wherever you get podcasts.
A few notes: This episode is produced in partnership with Ploughshares, a foundation committed to reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear threats. I’ll have a follow-up episode at the end of the conference discussing what exactly happened during the NPT RevCon.
Also, I’ll be attending much of the RevCon in person. I’ll be serving as something of a “pool reporter,” covering this conference in support of dozens of international journalists who report on nuclear security issues and feeding them news and insights from the confab.This project is backed by the Stanley Center for Peace and Security Developing Story Project, an initiative to support, strengthen, and sustain reporting on nuclear weapons and related issues. I’m looking forward to this.
If you are around the UN, say hi. And be sure to follow our new Global Dispatches WhatsApp Channel for updates from the RevCon and other happenings around the world of the UN.
Transcript edited for clarity
Mark Leon Goldberg: So, Kelsey, we are speaking just at the start of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, and we’ll unpack what that means. But to kick off, can I have you explain to the audience what is the NPT, and how does it work?
Kelsey Davenport: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty really is designed to do three things that form the bedrock of the broader non-proliferation and arms control regime.
First, it commits the states that had tested nuclear weapons prior to the negotiation of the treaty — So, the United States, the Soviet Union, now Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France, to halt the arms race and engage in negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons. So, essentially, it commits them to nuclear disarmament. The second aspect of the treaty is that it commits all countries that joined the treaty that did not possess nuclear weapons to refrain from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.
So, that’s really the nonproliferation component. And it was the primary driver of the negotiations on the NPT. The United States and the Soviet Union were both concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons. And then the third aspect is that the treaty guarantees that states that join can still access nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, provided they put those programs under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. So, those are really what are referred to as the three pillars of the NPT — nuclear arms control and disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation, and access to nuclear technology for peaceful uses.
Mark Leon Goldberg: And big picture, since 1970, how has the NPT fared?
Kelsey Davenport: The NPT has been remarkably successful, particularly in preventing the spread of new nuclear-armed states. As a result of the negotiation of the NPT, a number of countries that were interested in developing nuclear weapons, that had pursued nuclear weapons-relevant research, renounced those programs and joined the treaty. The treaty has proved successful in terms of giving the IAEA access to countries, which has been detected when there has been illicit nuclear activities ongoing.
You know, the Iraq WMD program, for instance, demonstrated the importance of these types of safeguards. And the treaty has facilitated access to critical nuclear technologies that countries are using for a range of civil purposes — everything from power to the development of medical isotopes. But it’s also not without controversy. Particularly in the last decade or so, a lot of the non-nuclear weapon states have been critical of the nuclear weapon states for failing to meet their disarmament commitments, when we saw throughout the Cold War and after the Cold War, the United States and Russia in particular take significant steps to cut the size of their nuclear arsenals.
All of which was consistent with the goals of the NPT. But that progress has reversed. And now we are seeing all of the nuclear-armed states investing in new nuclear delivery systems, and some countries even expanding their nuclear arsenals. So, that period of success is now being questioned as states really are examining whether the NPT provides security benefits and whether it can actually facilitate nuclear disarmament.
Mark Leon Goldberg: And I think possibly that brings us to the review conference that kicks off at the UN, which is the opportunity for states parties to the nonproliferation treaty to review progress against the treaty and also chart a path forward to potentially strengthen it. What are some of the big issues you see coming into this RevCon? And I suppose, again, big picture, what is the significance of this particular Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference?
Kelsey Davenport: This review conference is extremely significant because it comes at a time when nuclear norms and the broader nonproliferation and disarmament architecture is under attack on multiple fronts. And, to be honest, looking at this review conference, it’s hard to see what set of issues will not be contentious and controversial. Another thing I think that’s worth noting is that this review conference comes after the previous two review conferences failed to adopt a consensus final document. And the consensus final document generally contains actions that states commit to taking to further advance the goals and objectives of the treaty.
A final document is not the only measure of success of an NPT Review Conference, but a lot of states put premium on the adoption of this document to set a roadmap for how to ensure continued implementation of the treaty. And the president of the review conference has stated that he wants to see a final consensus document adopted. But negotiating it is going to be extremely difficult given the number of issues that are likely to be contentious. First, looking at sort of the disarmament pillar, the last remaining treaty, the New START Treaty, that governed nuclear warhead numbers for Russia and the United States has expired.
There are no constraints now on the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons programs. China is building up its nuclear warhead stockpile. All of the nuclear-weapon states are investing in new systems. These are viewed by many countries that are party to the NPT as a violation of the Article VI disarmament commitments. So, certainly, I think we’re going to see contention between the nuclear-armed states and the non-nuclear-weapon states over how to address and advance disarmament while all of these states are investing in new systems. Another contentious issue-
Mark Leon Goldberg: Can I just drill down a little bit on this disarmament issue, because in my kind of preparation for this interview and my preparation for coverage of RevCon, it is an issue that is coming up repeatedly, particularly among most of the world that is a party to the NPT that is not a nuclear weapons state. You described the three parts of the NPT treaty, disarmament being one of the three kind of legs of the stool. And this is the leg that is withering, I would venture, you know, most quickly for the reasons you described, for the fact that there is no longer any bilateral agreements between Russia and the United States on the size of their nuclear stockpiles for the fact that China is rapidly developing its nuclear weapons program.
And this is seen, at least from the diplomatic angle that I’ve reported on, as a real affront to the NPT as a whole.
Kelsey Davenport: I think a number of non-nuclear weapons states understandably feel betrayed by the nuclear weapons states continuing to invest in new nuclear weapons systems that may make the use of nuclear weapons more likely, and the broader failure of the international system to condemn aggression by nuclear weapons states. The investment in new nuclear weapons systems, the expansion of the Chinese arsenal, for instance, none of this is happening in isolation. It’s happening against the backdrop where Russia, a nuclear weapons state, waged an illegal war of aggression against Ukraine.
It’s happening against the backdrop of the United States and Israel conducting illegal strikes against Iran. All of this drives questions amongst the non-nuclear weapons states about the value of the NPT in providing for their security. And it’s pushing states that typically have been proactive members in the NPT and pushing for disarmament to reconsider their relationship with nuclear weapons. And that’s why these issues are all connected and have to be viewed within this broader security environment where additional states are beginning to ask if nuclear deterrence or if some type of nuclear extended deterrent relationship with the nuclear weapons state is more advantageous than pushing for full implementation of the NPT.
Mark Leon Goldberg: So, disarmament, one key contentious issue that is sure to come up during this review conference. What else do you expect?
Kelsey Davenport: The security of safeguarded nuclear facilities is going to be another issue that could likely spur contention within the review conference. In the past several years, Russia attacked safeguarded nuclear facilities in Ukraine and is illegally occupying the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant.
Mark Leon Goldberg: The largest in Europe.
Kelsey Davenport: The largest in Europe, yes.
Mark Leon Goldberg: And it’s come under periodic attack, which is wildly irresponsible and scary.
Kelsey Davenport: Well, it’s not just attack of the facility itself. It’s attack of the infrastructure that’s necessary to safely run the facility. I mean, continued attacks against the power lines that connect Zaporizhzhia to the grid, concerns about cooling systems. The head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Rafael Mariano Grossi, has repeatedly raised concerns about the safety of that facility. But it’s not just Zaporizhzhia. I mean, the United States in June conducted military strikes against safeguarded nuclear facilities in Iran, despite there being no evidence that Iran had made a decision to weaponize its nuclear program.
Similar strikes against safeguarded nuclear facilities have occurred since February 28th. So, again, there is this broader question about whether the NPT can actually provide protection for safeguarded nuclear programs in these non-nuclear-weapon states. And I think we’re likely to see Iran calling for condemnation of the U.S. strikes and Ukraine wanting to see some language regarding the security implications of Russia’s illegal occupation of Zaporizhzhia.
So, again, this could become a contentious issue, particularly if states insist on specifically naming aggressors. And if Iran tries to push for language condemning the United States, the U.S., of course, is going to object to any type of language in a consensus document that directly names it. Similar to the Russian case of Ukraine, actually was the naming of Russia’s aggression against Zaporizhzhia that prevented the adoption of a final document at the 2022 NPT Review Conference. So, this is still an issue. It’s going to be an issue in this review conference.
Mark Leon Goldberg: Any other key issues that you see being particularly contentious going into this?
Kelsey Davenport: I think the states’ parties need to be taking a better look at the relationship between advancing interest in nuclear energy programs, particularly the states that want to acquire the means of producing fissile materials, so uranium enrichment or plutonium separation, as part of those programs. And that link to proliferation concerns. If you look at South Korea, for instance, South Korea recently reached an agreement with the United States that indicates U.S. support for domestic uranium enrichment in South Korea.
There’s also a very active debate going on in South Korea right now about the value of domestic nuclear weapons to deter North Korea. Similarly, it looks like the United States is going to support Saudi Arabia having some type of domestic uranium enrichment program without more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. All of these instances raise the concern that states are going to move closer to nuclear weapons by developing the capabilities to produce fissile material as part of nuclear energy programs.
So, I think trying to affirm the importance of IAEA safeguards, trying to push for universalization of more intrusive IAEA safeguards, a mechanism known as the Additional Protocol, that should be part of this NPT review conference to ensure that states are not trying to exploit the NPT’s provisions that guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear programs to move closer to nuclear weapons capabilities.
Mark Leon Goldberg: So, you mentioned the Iran war, specifically American and Israeli attacks on nuclear sites in Iran as being a particularly potentially contentious issue at this review conference. Are there other ways that you foresee the conflict in the Middle East as seeping into the conversations at RevCon?
Kelsey Davenport: Absolutely. One critical issue that I should have mentioned before when you asked about controversy at the review conference is that there is also an active discussion in Iran right now about withdrawing from the nuclear non-proliferation treaties. And an Iranian lawmaker introduced a bill to the Iranian parliament that would necessitate withdrawal from the NPT. That measure has not been passed. It would still need to be approved by the Guardian Council.
But increasingly in Iran, the factions that are in favor of nuclear weaponization, that view the development of nuclear weapons as necessary to deter further attacks against the territory of Iran, these voices are gaining prominence. They’re gaining support. So, there is a concern that going into the NPT review conference, that during the conference itself, there’s going to be a more active debate about withdrawal from the NPT. And if Iran begins that movement, I think other states are going to be watching very closely to see what consequences Iran might face and how the international community responds to a withdrawal.
Because one important aspect, particularly related to the nonproliferation pillar of the NPT, is that a lot of the successes in the non-proliferation aspect of the broader regime have come because there was general unity in how to respond to proliferation threats. We didn’t always see the P5 states act in complete unity. But certainly, we saw a willingness to hold states accountable for violations of the NPT. We saw this in the case of North Korea. We initially saw this in the case of Iran in the lead up to the negotiations of the 2015 nuclear deal, and the Security Council passing sanctions, demonstrating that there were consequences for violations of the safeguards that are required by the NPT.
There’s no longer any guarantee that the Security Council is willing to enforce the NPT because of the divide between Europe and the United States on one side and Russia on the other. And so, there is a real risk that states may try to exploit this growing divide in order to advance nuclear programs to the cusp of weaponization while minimizing the opportunity for consequences, minimizing the costs that they might pay through sanctions and diplomatic isolation. So that’s another dynamic in the Middle East that we could see impacting the broader review conference.
Mark Leon Goldberg: Yeah, this idea that if Iran exits the NPT, it might potentially open the floodgates for others if Iran doesn’t face any meaningful consequences for exiting the NPT. What are you looking or expecting from the American delegation at the Review Conference this year?
Kelsey Davenport: It’s really hard to say how the Trump administration is going to approach the review conferences. There are indications from U.S. statements over the past six months that the United States is increasingly comfortable with the being singled out with isolation in international fora. And to me, this raises the concern that the U.S. may view the review conference as a forum for calling out activities by particular states, probably most notably China, that it views as inconsistent with the NPT. This could be about China’s buildup of its nuclear arsenal. This could be about the U.S. allegations that China has been conducting nuclear tests.
But if the U.S. decides to approach the review conference as a forum for singling out adversarial states, then it’s extremely unlikely that the review conference will be able to adopt a final document. And it’s extremely unlikely that there is going to be the productive discussion about key issues that could lead to outcomes that advance and strengthen the treaty. Another aspect I would flag is that the U.S. is now engaged in an aggressive push to expand nuclear energy, both domestically, but also how the Trump administration is seeking to sign contracts for U.S. reactor exports overseas.
But there is no indication that the Trump administration is putting a high premium on advancing safeguards and calling for more intrusive International Atomic Energy Agency monitoring verification as part of that nuclear energy push. So, there could be tension in the Review Conference between the U.S. push to expand nuclear energy while other states are also trying to push for the universalization and strengthening of safeguards.
Mark Leon Goldberg: So, you mentioned a few times of the kind of challenge to getting a consensus final outcome document from this conference. And I’ve not covered an NPT RevCon in particular in the past, but I’ve covered many UN conferences that are similar process-wise. And the idea is that you have these weeks of negotiations that all lead up to this consensus document that reflects all of the things that were agreed upon at this conference and even in the weeks and months prior.
But oftentimes this outcome document, whether one exists or whether one has failed to be adopted, is like a measure of success for the conference itself. So, I suppose, Kelsey, to what extent do you see the ability of this conference to produce that consensus final outcome document, basically reflecting where countries stand on the NPT today, where they see it going in the future as being a measure of success for this conference?
Kelsey Davenport: I don’t think that the conference should solely be defined as successful or unsuccessful on the basis of a final document. Certainly, final documents are important. They can reiterate and reaffirm past commitments that states have made to strengthen the NPT and set out new actions that would advance the goals of the treaty. That blueprint for moving forward does provide a metric against which to measure states’ actions. So, certainly, there’s value to a final document.
But it’s not the only measure of success. The NPT Review Conference is an important forum for discussing and advancing mechanisms, for clarifying understandings about nuclear aspects. That still has value, even in the absence of a final document. But I do think that there’s going to be more pressure on the production of a final document at this review conference than we’ve seen in the past because it follows two review conferences where a final document has not been adopted.
A third could be perceived as diminishing support for the NPT and erosion of the NPT overall. But another challenge to getting the final document is that there appears to be some tension between states about what a final document should look like. There are states that are going to push for a robust action plan that includes more specific steps to advance all three of the pillars of the NPT. So, perhaps similar to the 2010 NPT Review Conference final document, the last time a final document was adopted, which included a set of specific actions.
I think there are other states who are going to see value in the adoption of a final document, even if it does not include a robust action plan. So, they may see value in a final document that simply reaffirms the general commitment to the NPT and puts on the back burner or waters down some of the controversies that are going to plague the conference, like whether or not to condemn attacks on nuclear facilities, whether or not to call for a halting of nuclear modernization.
So, there’s going to be some tension that the chair of the NPT Review Conference and the state parties are going to have to navigate as they consider not only the value of trying to reach that final document as a metric of success, but specifically kind of what it contains.
Mark Leon Goldberg: Well, can I ask you, because again, having covered so many UN conferences before, this is like an ever-present question, whether or not a watered-down agreement is better than no agreement at all, if the more ambitious agreement is not realistically adoptable — Where do you stand on that question?
Kelsey Davenport: Oh, it’s challenging. I think that there are a number of contentious issues that, if not addressed, will continue to erode the NPT regime, will continue to erode confidence in the NPT. And watering over these issues, trying to water down the controversies in favor of consensus, I think, risks contributing to that overall discontent that the NPT no longer serves security interests, that it is no longer fit for the current security environment.
So, I would be hesitant. to push for a simple final document that does not adequately attempt to address some of these broader issues. At the same time, I don’t see value in trying to single out specific states for condemnation within the NPT review conference process or final document. I don’t think that that is a worthwhile pursuit in terms of advancing the treaty. So, I would look for specific steps, perhaps even steps that states have agreed to in the past that address some of these contemporary concerns but still provide a concrete path forward as kind of the middle ground between a review conference process that tries to name and shame offenders within the regime and a final document that is kind of watered down, that contains no specific commitments or actions and simply reaffirms the treaties.
Mark Leon Goldberg: Well, Kelsey, thank you so much for your time. Anything else you wanted to get in before I let you go?
Kelsey Davenport: Just add that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains critical to preventing both the use of nuclear weapons and their proliferation. States need to approach this conference with seriousness, with a willingness to compromise, but also with innovation and flexibility. There is a pathway forward for advancing this treaty at the review conference if states are willing to negotiate and engage in good faith and look for those creative and flexible solutions.
Mark Leon Goldberg: Well, as always, thank you so much for your time and your expertise. This was a really helpful curtain raiser for this conference.
Kelsey Davenport: Well, thank you so much for having me.
